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Let Me Vote!
An experimental study of vote rotation in
committees
R. Bosman†, P. Maier†, V. Sadiraj‡, F. van Winden
†De Nederlandsche Bank∗ ‡University of Arizona
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting
increases a committee’s efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation is
likely to critically influence collective and individual welfare. The experi-
ment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus
common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of a rotation
scheme has important consequences: it ‘pays’ to be allowed to vote, as
voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting mem-
bers. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees
decide faster and block fewer decisions. This reduces frustration among
committee members.
Keywords: Decision-making, committee, experiment, voting, rotation
JEL codes: D70, D78, E58
1 Introduction
Many people feel that committees lead to endless discussions.1 Ways are sought
to increase a committees’ efficiency, defined as (a) a committee’s ability to reach
agreement and (b) to maximise the committee members’ objective function in
a timely efficient way. Implementation of a rotation scheme – i.e. restricting
∗Corresponding author: Philipp Maier, De Nederlandsche Bank, Monetary and Economic
Policy Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Email: p.maier@dnb.nl.
The views expressed are the authors’ and need not reflect those of De Nederlandsche Bank.
We wish to thank Jos Theelen for programming the computer software and Karin Breen for
research assistance. Helpful comments from participants of the 2004 Public Choice Conference
in Baltimore and the 2004 ESA Conference in Tuscon are gratefully acknowledged.
1‘Had Newton served on more faculty committees at Cambridge, his first law of motion
might have read: A decisionmaking body at rest or in motion tends to stay at rest or in
motion in the same direction unless acted upon by an outside force’ (Blinder, 1998).
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the right to vote on a rotating basis – is one such possibility. As an example,
U.S. monetary policy decisions are taken by the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The FOMC comprises
seven Board members, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
and four of eleven regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents.2 The latter serve
one-year terms on a rotating basis. Chappell et al. (2004) conclude that the
non-voting FOMC members did not significantly influence decision-making in
the FOMC.3 Thus, there is a risk that decisions might be biased towards the in-
dividual interests of the persons currently allowed to vote. Rotation may speed
up decision-making, but potentially at high social costs if there is a conflict
between the common and individual interests.
The formal study of committees goes back to Condorcet (1785), who viewed
committees as tools to efficiently aggregate information. The literature has
focused on various aspects of committee decision-making. First, various au-
thors have examined committees’ abilities to pool and process information (e.g.
Bulkley et al., 2001, Blinder and Shiller, 2004).4 Second, the merits of different
decision rules have been analysed extensively (see Mueller, 2003), also in situ-
ations where conflicting preferences promote manipulation (Li et al., 2001). A
third strand of the literature focuses on private versus public information, which
enables strategic interaction among committee members. Gerling et al. (2003)
provides an overview of studies in this area. Fourth, behavioural economists
have studied – among other things – the trade-off between common and indi-
vidual interests (e.g. Kagel and Roth, 1995).5
Experimental studies on the effectiveness of committee decision-making as
defined above are relatively scarce. Waldner et al. (2003) is the only experi-
mental study focusing on rotation, examining the effect of rotation on decisions
for the voluntary provision of a public good, where insiders can exclude out-
siders from the benefits of the public good. Their results indicate that rotation
need not change the provision of the public good, but a strong temptation
exists for insiders to exploit outsiders’ contribution to the public good by exclu-
sion. Other experimental studies explore the effect of uncertainty on committee
decision-making: Blinder and Morgan (2005) find that groups are not more in-
ertial and make better decisions than individuals; similar findings are reported
by Lombardelli et al. (2002).
2Johnson (1995) provides a good summary of the founding of the Federal Reserve.
3‘The results indicate that non-voting alternates have no appreciable influence over policy
outcomes... If policymaking in the FOMC is consensual, that consensus does not appear to
encompass the views of non-voting members’ (Chappel et al., 2004, p. 418).
4Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990) conclude that a committee ‘...is superfluous if it possesses
no special expertise and informational inefficiency is increasing in the uncertainty associated
with the policy.’
5Beniers and Swank (2004) and Maier et al. (2003) have studied the optimal composition
of a committee.
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This paper investigates the following research questions: Is rotation a useful
tool to increase a committee’s efficiency in a common knowledge information
setting? Does the type of rotation scheme matter? Does rotation lead to frus-
tration with negative behavioural consequences? And does a temporary lack of
voting power result in ‘being ripped off’? To explore these questions we develop
an experiment whereby participants have to trade-off private versus common
payoffs. Committees consist of five members. We examine three treatments:
first, no rotation, i.e. every member is allowed to vote. Second, three out of five
committee members are allowed to vote, and every player rotates at the same
frequency. Third, one player has permanent voting rights, whereas the other
four players rotate at the same speed. In addition, we measure the players’
emotions. To remove possible distortions arising from uncertainty, signalling
behaviour etc., we provide all committee members with full information.
Our main findings are the following: Rotation increases a committee’s effi-
ciency, but induces distributional effects. The right to vote ‘pays off’, and voting
committee members ‘exploit’ the non-voting members. Moreover, in committees
without rotation decisions are blocked more frequently. As the costs of block-
ing a decision are high, all rotation schemes outperform a situation without
rotation for the committee as a whole. Committee members blocking decisions
are punished by other committee members, even though the punishment comes
at a cost for the punishing player and is only possible at the very end of the
experiment. Lastly, all committee members could have increased their earnings
by voting for the option with the highest payoff for the committee as a whole.
It seems that by voting for own interests, the players end up in a ‘prisoners’
dilemma’-like situation, whereby each committee member earns less.
In what follows we discuss the design of the experiment (section 2), before
we present our results in section 3. The final section discusses our main findings
and applies them to the institutional setting of U.S. monetary policy.
2 Experimental design and behavioural consid-
erations
2.1 Design
The design of the experiment was chosen such that each committee member
faced a trade-off between ‘own’ and ‘common’ interests in a full information
environment.6 This reflects the idea that committees as a whole are responsible
6All experimental sessions were run at the Creed Laboratory of the University of Amster-
dam. Subjects were recruited online and through announcements on bulletin boards. One
experimental session lasted about 2.5 hours and average earnings per subject were 44.4 euro.
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for the decision taken, while individual committee members might follow their
own (private) agenda. Each committee comprises five members and has to
decide between four options.7 Based on the decision taken each player receives
the following payoff:
• Each player earns an individual payoff according to his preferences (see
example below).
• In addition, each player receives a common payoff. The common payoff is
the weighted average of the individual payoffs. In calculating the weighted
average three players weigh 10 percent each, and two players weigh 35
percent each (one can interpret this as players representing ‘small’ and
‘large’ regions). This payoff ensures that by setting an appropriate policy,
welfare gains for the committee as a whole can be generated.
The total payoff for each player is the sum of the individual plus the com-
mon payoff. The preference structure – determining the individual payoff – of
each player is characterized by a single-peaked, symmetric distribution. In each
round, the peak of the distribution varies for each region.
Table 1 provides an example. For each option the individual payoffs per
region are given by the first five rows. The next row shows the common payoff,
that is the weighted sum of the individual payoffs (note that the countries 2 and
5 are given the weight of the ‘large’ regions, i.e. 35 percent each). Finally, the
total payoff is given by the sum of the individual plus the common payoff. For
example, should option 1 be chosen, the total payoff for player 1 is 350+265=615
eurocent. To isolate the effects of rotation and avoid distortions due to imperfect
information, we have chosen a full information setting, whereby every player
has full information about other player’s incentive structure (i.e. every player
receives the information contained in table 1).
In this example player 3, say, faces the following conflict: by voting for option
1 he maximises the common payoff and the payoff for the committee as a whole.
However, this option also yields the lowest payoff of all options for himself.
Option 4 would maximise player 3’s total payoff, but a very low common and
total payoff for the committee as a whole. Given these considerations it is not
evident for which option player 3 will eventually vote.
The peaks of the distribution are chosen in such a way that over all rounds,
every player experiences the peak at option 1, option 2 etc. equally often.8 As
7We use the terms ‘players’, ‘committee members’ and ‘regions’ interchangeably. Note that
this interpretation was not given during the experiment. The instructions distributed to the
participants (and read aloud by the experimenter) and detailed rotation schemes are available
upon request.
8An overview of the distribution of the peaks over the rounds is available upon request.
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Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Player 1 350 200 100 25
Player 2 200 350 200 100
Individual payoff Player 3 25 100 200 350
Player 4 350 200 100 25
Player 5 350 200 100 25
Common payoff 265 242.5 145 83.75
Player 1 615 442.5 245 108.75
Total payoff Player 2 465 592.5 345 183.75
(=individual + Player 3 290 342.5 345 433.75
common payoff) Player 4 615 442.5 245 108.75
Player 5 615 442.5 245 108.75
Table 1: Example of distribution of payoffs (in eurocent)
every participant experiences the same incentives equally often, we can compare
the players’ behaviour both across regions and treatments. During the exper-
iment decisions are taken according to the following procedure: A sequence of
players is randomly determined to make a proposal (which is made public), sat-
isfying the condition that, over all rounds, every player gets to make the first,
second or third proposal equally often. According to this sequence, player i,
say, makes the first proposal. If this option is unanimously supported, it will be
implemented.9 If it is vetoed by any region, the next in the sequence is to make
a new proposal, etc.10 Every option can only be proposed once and each com-
mittee member has the power to veto any given proposal (except one’s own).
When four proposals are vetoed, we count this as a ‘blocked decision’ and each
participant is paid 10 eurocent.11
We investigate three different decision-making schemes (experimental treat-
ments): ‘no rotation’, ‘equal rotation’ and ‘unequal rotation’. Each treatment
is run with different participants and is played by 15 groups.
• No rotation (NR): All five committee members vote on all proposals.
• Equal rotation (ER): Only three members are allowed to vote. Regardless
of the size of the region all committee members rotate equally often. This
implies that every player votes in 60 percent of the rounds (see appendix
A for the rotation scheme, which was also handed out to the participants).
9Blinder and Morgan (2005) do not find differences between group decisions made by
majority rule and unanimity during an experiment. By imposing unanimity as decision rule
we can also investigate the extent to which the outcomes in the experiment differ from the
theoretical predictions of majority voting.
10A similar procedure isused in Fréchette et al. (2003), where bargaining in legislature is
studied.
11Hence, the payoff if a decision has been blocked is considerably lower than the payoff
for ‘the worst possible option’. Note that strictly speaking, the last ‘proposal’ is not chosen
among different options, but is simply the remaining option.
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• Unequal rotation (UR): Only three members are allowed to vote. One
large region always votes while the other large region rotates with the
same frequency as the small regions (those regions vote in 50 percent of
the rounds).
The rationale behind granting permanent representation to one large region
is to investigate whether permanent representation (i.e. knowing that one player
will always vote and participate in each decision) leads to differences in outcome:
As the two large regions differ only that respect, differences in voting patterns
or earnings between these two (otherwise identical) regions can be attributed to
the permanent representation.
Each committee played 50 rounds under the scheme ‘no rotation’ and ‘equal
rotation’ and 48 rounds under ‘unequal rotation’.12 To counter income effects
10 rounds are randomly chosen at the end of the experiment for paying out. It
is important to stress that players are given conflicting incentives as the option
yielding the highest payoff differs between players. However, over all rounds,
committee members face similar possibilities to ‘earn and exploit’, in the sense
that (i) each member experiences equally often the maximal payoff at option 1,
option 2, etc., (ii) each member votes an equal number of times,13 and (iii) each
player has similar positions in the voting procedure (i.e. every player has equal
possibilities to make the first, second or third proposal).
To check whether the participants understood the instructions each player
had to answer some test questions about the experiment before the actual ex-
periment started. To investigate affective responses we used additional tools:
• During the experiment participants were asked to rate their mood on
a scale of 1 (very happy) to 9 (very unhappy) after every 10th round
(starting at round 5).14
• At the end of the experiment participants had to report their emotions
by rating the experienced intensity of thirteen different emotions on a 7-
point scale, ranging from ‘no emotion at all’ (1) to ‘high intensity of the
emotion’ (7). The list includes the following emotions: Irritation, anger,
contempt, envy, jealousy, sadness, joy, happiness, shame, fear, surprise,
pride, and relief.15
12The number of rounds differs between ER and UR because of differences in the ‘voting
cycle’: per voting cycle each player meets all other players the same number of times. The
voting cycle is ten rounds (each player meets every other player three out of ten times) under
no rotation and equal rotation, but six rounds (each rotating player meets every other rotating
member one out of six times) under unequal rotation.
13The only exception is, of course, one large country under unequal rotation.
14‘Self-report is the most common and potentially the best (...) way to measure a person’s
emotional experiences’ (see Robinson and Clore, 2002, p. 934).
15Apart from the negative emotions that were expected to be particularly relevant for
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• As part of the debriefing procedure all players were given the opportu-
nity to ‘punish’ or ‘reward’ other players. The procedure used was the
following. Each player received a lump sum payment of 600 eurocents,
which was independent of the earnings in the voting experiment. This
payment could be pocketed, or used to reward or punish other players in
the player’s group by up to 75 eurocents per player.
Rewarding and punishing came at a cost: each eurocent spent for rewards
or punishment cost an additional cent (hence, each player could thus use
up to 300 eurocents to reward or punish). In addition, each player could
be rewarded or punished by others with a maximum of 300 eurocents.16
Lastly, we asked the participants to fill in a questionnaire after the experiment.
2.2 Behavioural considerations
Based on economic theory one can think of different hypotheses concerning the
participants’ behaviour and the outcome of the experiment:
• Naive voting: Players are self-interested, but lack any strategic behaviour;
they only propose and accept the option that gives the highest total payoff
for themselves (i.e. highest common plus individual payoff);
• Strategic voting: Players behave like gamesmen maximising their own
payoff and behave strategically in proposing options and vetoing them.
This behavioural mode is normally assumed in the literature on game
theory.17
• Median voter decisive: The preferred option of the median voter is chosen
(this option would be chosen under the majority rule);
• Highest common payoff: Players do not maximise their own payoff, but
the common payoff of the committee.
• Highest total group payoff: Maximisation of the sum of the total payoff
over all players. This mode also provides a benchmark for how much the
group as a whole could have earned (i.e. it can be viewed as maximisation
of ‘total social payoff’).18
reciprocity (anger, irritation) some other negative as well as positive emotions were included
as filler items, to avoid pushing participants in a particular direction.
16In order not to bias their decisions, players were unaware of this possibility during the
experiment. Note also rewards and punishments cannot change other participants’ earnings
relative to one’s owns, hence if they occur, they are likely to reflect emotional factors.
17Because players have complete information in each round, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium for each round. Although this equilibrium result may be attainable via different
paths, the theoretical outcome is always unique.
18Note that in 7 out of 50 rounds the predictions for the mode ‘highest total group payoff’
differ from those for ‘highest common payoff’.
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Voting for highest total group payoff also maximises every players’ total pay-
off, averaged over all rounds. Note, however, that in many rounds players have
an incentive to deviate from maximising the group payoff by chosing options
which maximise their individual (total) payoff. In this respect, the experiment
constitutes a prisoners’ dilemma-like situation.
We derived theoretical predictions for the ‘winning option’ for each mode
(see appendix B). In addition, for strategic voting we also derived the path to
the winning option, i.e. from the first proposal to the final decision.
3 Results
3.1 Does rotation influence earnings?
Arguably the most interesting question is whether or not implementation of a
rotation scheme leads to differences in earnings. Are the non-voting members
justified in fearing that they will be ripped off if they are not allowed to vote?
In short the answer is: yes. We have two pieces of evidence, between and
within treatments.
Earnings of voting versus non-voting members (between treatments)
We start by comparing the earnings of the voting and the non-voting committee
members. Our null hypothesis is that rotation does not change earnings when
moving from no rotation to a system of equal rotation; the alternative hypothesis
is than (mean) earnings are higher for voting members. Our data rejects the
null:19 Earnings of the voting committee members under equal rotation increase
by about 6 percent (from 4.4 to 4.7), relative to earnings of the voting committee
members under no rotation, whereas earnings of those committee members that
are not allowed to vote under rotation decrease by about 2.5 percent (from 4.3
to 4.2). Figure 1 displays the earnings of regions under no rotation and equal
rotation, whereby we group the regions into two groups: those that ‘retain’ the
voting power when the rotation scheme is implemented, and those that lose the
right to vote. For those two groups we graph the deviation from average earnings
(in percent). We clearly observe the increase in earnings for those that retain
their voting power, whereas earnings of the non-voting committee members fall.
Note that the differences between treatments are also statistically significant at
the 1 percent level (two-sided Mann-Whitney test).
Risk averse committee members might not only be interested in average
earnings, but also in the variance of their earnings. Table ?? shows that rotation
19As the setup of the rounds in the treatment ‘unequal rotation’ is different from the other
two, we cannot directly compare this treatment with the other two.
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Figure 1: Deviation from av. earnings of voting vs. non-voting committee
members (per round)
leads to a higher ‘polarisation’ of earnings, i.e. the difference in earnings between
voting and non-voting committee members increases as a result of rotation.
After correcting for rounds where no decisions were taken, we find that in the
equal rotation treatment the variance of the earnings is significantly higher than
in the no rotation treatment.20 If players are risk-averse, one could imagine that
they do not like the higher variability in earnings under rotation. This is not
what we find: As we show in more detail in section 3.3, our measurement of
emotions does not reveal statistically significant differences in happiness between
treatments. Hence, we can reject the hypothesis that relatively higher variability
in earnings has negative consequences for (emotional) well-being.
Earnings within each treatment
That having the right to vote pays off is also supported by looking at earnings
within each experimental treatment. Comparing average earnings per round,
the null hypothesis is that no differences are found between between rounds
where regions do or do not have the right to vote (the alternative hypothesis
is that earnings differ depending on whether or not regions have the right to
vote). Again we can reject the null, as earnings increase substantially when
one has the right to vote: In the equal rotation treatment, small regions earn
20The differences between equal and unequal rotation on the one hand, and no rotation
and unequal rotation on the other, are insignificant (Mann Whitney tests, the difference in
variation between no rotation and equal rotation is significant at the 1 percent level, the other
two are only significant at the 20 percent level).
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Figure 2: Influence of the right to vote on earnings
5.4 percent more in that case, while big regions receive a whopping 20 percent
extra. In the unequal rotation treatment, earnings of small regions increase by
almost 11 percent, and the rotating large country earns almost 15 percent more
(earnings in eurocent are displayed in figure 2).
Hence, substantial distributional effects occur between small and large re-
gions. Big regions gain more than small regions when they can vote. On the
other hand, they have more to lose if they are not allowed to vote. In the un-
equal rotation treatment we see a similar pattern, although the differences in
earnings between big and small regions are less pronounced.
Lastly, similar results are found when examining differences in earnings be-
tween the two big regions. Recall that the two were identical, except that in the
unequal rotation case one region was granted permanent voting rights. Compar-
ing earnings within the unequal rotation treatment between the two big regions
for rounds in which the rotating region does not have the right to vote (i.e. for
24 out of 48 rounds), we find that ‘permanent in’ region earns on average 7
percent more than the ‘rotating’ region.
Rotation hardly changes total earnings
Summarising the above, under rotation the voting committee members earn
more than the non-voting committee members. Given these distributional ef-
fects, one might wonder whether rotation also influences the payoffs of the com-
mittee as a whole (i.e. does rotation expand the ‘pie’ or is the ‘pie’ simply
distributed in a different way?).
The left part of table 2 reports earnings per player for all three treatments,
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All regions Av. payoff Possible gaina
No rotation 439 12.1 %
Equal rotation 449 9.6 %
Unequal rotation 449 9.6 %
aThe ‘possible gain’ is the difference between actual payoffs and the payoffs that could have
been realised when maximising the total payoff.
Table 2: Earnings per player per round incl. vetoes in eurocent
averaged over all rounds.21 On average, each player earns 4.39 euro per round in
the no rotation treatment. Average earnings are about 2 percent higher under
rotation. This difference is significant at the 5 and 10 percent level for equal
and unequal rotation, respectively. Hence, we can conclude that rotation has
primarily distributional effects, and only a very marginal effect on total earnings
of the committee.
On the other hand, the maximum average payoff each player could have
obtained per round was 492 eurocent. The right part of table 2 indicates how
much (on average) could have been gained, had all players simply voted for the
option that maximises total group payoff. In the rotation treatments, committee
members could have earned almost 10 percent more; without rotation earnings
could have been more than 12 percent higher. Additional tests indicate that
simply voting for the option that maximises the total group payoff would have
increased earnings of all committee members, irrespective of their size. In other
words, because players do not simply vote for the option that maximises the
total payoff of the committee as a whole, but instead vote for own interests, the
committee ends up in a ‘prisoners’ dilemma’-like situation and each committee
member earns less.
3.2 Behavioural modes
If, in addition to the findings reported so far, we are able to identify typical
behavioural modes, we can better describe the conditions under which the choice
of a particular decision-making system might influence the outcome. Suppose,
for instance, that all players aim to maximise the committee’s total payoff. In
that case the winning option will not be influenced by the composition of the
committee. If, however, the participants vote strategically or if the median voter
is decisive, then the composition of the committee is indeed a crucial factor in
determining the outcome of a decision.
Overall, more than 88 percent of the results is consistent with at least one
behavioural mode. In what follows we analyse the extent to which the behaviour
21The term ‘total earnings’ refers to the sum of ‘individual’ and ‘common’ payoff, i.e. the
total earning of a player per decision.
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Figure 3: Behavioural modes and outcomes in percent of correct predictions
of the participants is consistent with the different modes outlined in section 2.2.
Unfortunately, this is not as straightforward as it may seem, as in many cases
the theoretical predictions yield similar outcomes. We thus have to find ways to
distinguish between the various modes. We start by observing that blocking a
decision is inconsistent with all behavioural modes. Therefore, in what follows
we exclude rounds where the final proposal has been vetoed. After excluding
these rounds, figure 3 shows the percentage of decisions that is consistent with
each of the modes considered. Moreover, it is apparent that naive voting is not
very prominent, and maximisation of the common payoff seems to do worse than
maximisation of the total payoff. The case for strategic versus median voting
is more ambiguous. In addition, as many results are consistent with more than
one behavioural mode, we must seek ways to distinguish them.
As next step we therefore exclude rounds that yield similar predictions.
To maximise the number of rounds with different predictions we take the be-
havioural modes two by two and test which one performs better.22 Two such
tests are displayed in table 3, where we report how many rounds are consistent
with the theoretical predictions (in percent). The upper half tests the mode ‘me-
dian voter decisive’ against ‘Maximisation of the total payoff’ for those rounds
where the outcomes predicted are different. The predictions differ sufficiently
to be able to test the two modes in all three treatments. Clearly, maximisation
of the total payoff is less frequently employed by the players.23 The lower half
of table 3 compares strategic voting versus the median being decisive. Again,
22To save space we summarise the main results, additional tests are available upon request.
23Similar results are found when testing the median voter against maximisation of the
common payoff.
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No rotation Equal rotation Unequal rotation
Median voter decisive 42.9% 56.0% 55.1%
Total payoff 29.7% 27.2% 28.9%
P-value χ2 test 0.1 0.0 0.0
Median voter decisive 50.4% - -
Strategic voting 39.3% - -
P-value χ2 test 0.0 - -
Note: Only rounds where the strategies differ are considered; rounds with
blocked decision are excluded.
Table 3: Testing the different behavioural modes (percentage of correct predic-
tions)
the behavioural mode ‘median voter decisive’ is the more prominent one, as it is
able to explain more decisions than strategic voting (a χ2 test reveals that the
differences are significant at the 1 percent level). Note, however, that the two
modes yield similar predictions in the treatments equal and unequal rotation.
To be able to differentiate between ‘median voter decisive’ and strategic
voting in the rotation treatments additional evidence is needed. We postulate
that for an outcome to be consistent with median voting the first proposal also
needs to be the preferred outcome of the median voter, whereas in the case
of strategic voting the first proposal must be consistent with the theoretical
prediction.24 Table 4 tests the ability of the two behavioural modes to explain
the first proposal made in those rounds where both strategies yield different
predictions (under the assumptions made). Across all treatments median vot-
ing outperforms strategic voting (significant at the 1 percent level). A similar
comparison between median voting and maximisation of the total payoff again
reveals that median voting is able to explain the participants’ behaviour sig-
nificantly better.25 Overall, we find that median voting can best describe the
committee members’ behaviour. This holds irrespective of the voting procedure
(treatment). That said, note that median voting is only able to explain about
60 percent of the outcomes.26 This suggests that either different behavioural
modes are mixed over time, or that between or within groups participants follow
different modes.
Lastly, finding support for the median as being decisive also implies that if
24Note that in some cases various ‘paths’ lead to the same outcome. We only look at the
‘shortest’ path, i.e. the most direct way to obtain the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
25Table 4 seems to suggest that subjects find it easier to behave strategically in the rotation
treatments, as computing the backward induction path is easier for committees with three
members than for committees with five members. This is, however, not what we find, as there
are no statistically significant differences between treatments regarding the first proposals.
26Although we have imposed unanimity as decision-making rule about 60 percent of the
outcomes are still consistent with majority voting. Note also that if the first proposal is
consistent with majority voting this proposal is only vetoed in 36 percent of all cases. This
illustrates the ‘power’ the median voter seems to have.
13
No rotation Equal rotation Unequal rotation
Median voter decisive 42.5% 43.9% 53.4%
Strategic voting 19.7% 22.1% 21.0%
P-value χ2 test 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: Only rounds where the predicted first proposal differs are considered.
Table 4: Median voter decisive versus strategic voting (first proposals, percent-
age of correct predictions)
as a result of rotation the median voter changes, distributional effects will occur.
Indeed, looking at results for those rounds where rotation changes the median,
we find that outcomes change accordingly in 71 percent of the cases. In that
regard the results of this analysis correspond with our earlier findings.
3.3 Which decision-making procedure is preferable?
As we have seen implementation of a rotation scheme will influence earnings and
induce distributional effects. However, there are also other ways to investigate
the attractiveness of the various decision-making procedures. In what follows
differences across treatments are discussed with regard to how quickly decisions
are reached, how many decisions have been blocked, and in terms of rewards
and punishment.
Do smaller committees take faster decisions?
To investigate whether rotation speeds up a committee’s ability to take decisions
we examine how many proposals are made before a decision is reached and how
many decisions are blocked.
Figure 4 shows how long it takes to reach a decision. In the first round,
agreement was reached in 41.1 and 37.6 percent of all cases under unequal and
equal rotation, respectively. In comparison, only 27.1 percent of all proposals
were accepted in the first round in the no rotation-treatment. Overall, figure 4
clearly shows that with rotation, decisions are taken in an earlier phase of the
decision-making process compared to no rotation. The difference between no
rotation and equal/unequal roation is also statistically significant. In addition,
decisions are taken faster under unequal rotation than under equal rotation.27
Hence, if fast decision-making is important, our results clearly recommends
unequal rotation.
27All results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-sided Pearson χ2 test).
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Figure 4: How long does it take to reach a decision?
Why vetoes are important
Interestingly, introduction of a rotation scheme reduces the number of vetoes:
Without rotation, it turns out that in 41 out of 750 rounds, decisions are blocked.
Under equal and unequal rotation this number is much lower: 15 out of 750 and
17 out of 720 decision rounds, respectively.28 To check for habituation we plot
the number of blocked decisions for each treatment in figure 5. The number
of vetoes fluctuates somewhat over time, but there is no statistically significant
pattern. Further testing indicates that the relationship between the number
of vetoes and the rotation schemes is stable over time. This suggests that
committees do not learn to avoid vetoes over time.
These findings raise the question whether the drop in vetoes is the result of
having less people on a committee, or whether each committee member becomes
less ‘likely’ to veto a proposal. The latter is the case: Without rotation the
average committee member vetoes the last proposal with a probability of 1.2
percent. Under equal or unequal rotation this probability drops to 0.71 and 0.79
percent, respectively. Thus, each committee member becomes less likely to veto
the last proposal (similar results are found for earlier proposals). Lastly, note
that in the unequal rotation treatment the two large regions behave differently:
the rotating large region blocks twice as many decisions as the region with
permanent voting right (six versus three vetoes).
Regarding the interpretation of blocked decisions, ‘in real life’ not reaching
a decision need not always be a bad solution, as the decision to ‘do nothing’ can
actually be very wise. But note that any of the four options can also be regarded
28The differences between NR and ER and between NR and UR are also statistically sig-
nificant (two-sided Pearson χ2 test, all p-values<0.05).
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Figure 5: Blocked decisions
the decision to do nothing. This illustrates that blocking a decision is, in this
case, really a sign of not reaching an agreement in this round. Moreover, the
payoff for blocked decisions is considerably lower than that of every player’s least
preferred option. One might argue therefore that it is not economical to veto
the last proposal. On the other hand, blocking a decision can be seen as a costly
signal to the other committee members that certain options are unacceptable.
Emotions such as anger can lead to vetoes, but one can also use vetoes to build
up a ‘reputation’ or to ‘punish’ other players (due to lack of data we cannot
formally test for reputational effects).
The fact that fewer decisions are blocked under rotation has two important
implications.
• First, it increases players’ satisfaction: we find that groups where decisions
were blocked are significantly less happy than groups that have always
reached a decision.29
• Second, vetoes influence the extent to which players wish to punish or
reward other committee members at the end of the experiment, as shown
hereafter.
29Comparing groups in which decisions were blocked with groups where vetoes never oc-
cured, we find that blocking decisions lowers participants’ degree of happiness. This effect is
found for each of the first three measures of happiness(Mann-Whitney test, p=0.001). It is
not found in the data collected after rounds 35 and 45. This may be the result of habituation,
i.e. players get used to decisions being occasionally blocked. This result is not driven by the
number of vetoes, as in the later rounds the number of vetoes does not decrease significantly.
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Figure 6: Rewards and punishments
Rewards, punishment and emotions
As mentioned in section 2.1 each player had the opportunity to reward or punish
other players in the committee at the end of the experiment. In total, 51.6
percent of the players made use of the possibility. We find clear evidence that
players blocking the decision – i.e. vetoing the last proposal, which leads to ‘no
decision taken’ – are punished (see figure 6): players blocking final proposals
were on average punished by 26.9 eurocents, while those that did not block
a decision were – on average – rewarded by 4.9 eurocents. This difference is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the share of players
blocking a decision is substantially higher under no rotation than under the
two rotation treatments (28 percent of all players blocked one or more decisions
under no rotation, whereas only 19 percent of the players blocked decisions under
the two rotation treatments). In other words, blocking a decision by a ‘final veto’
occurs more often in the no rotation case, and this is regarded as sufficiently
negative to make others willing to sacrifice real resources for punishment, even
though the experiment has finished. If the negative feelings underlying such
behaviour persist, blocking decisions today in a committee could very well have
spill-over effects on other issues tomorrow. This is an area for future research.
Rewards and punishments are not related to total earnings (i.e. it is not the
case that ‘low income’ members are supported systematically (or ‘high income’
members are punished). Further analysis reveals relatively large differences
across treatments, e.g. the average punishment a large region received increases
from -34.3 eurocent under equal rotation to -49.1 eurocent under unequal ro-
tation. Recall that the difference between equal and unequal rotation stems
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from one large country having permanent voting rights, so it may seem plausi-
ble that the differences between those two treatments stem from differences in
behaviour of the two large regions. This is indeed what we find: distinguishing
the two large regions we find that the region with the permanent seat spends
about twice as much on rewards and punishments than the ‘rotating’ large re-
gion (p=0.09, two-sided Mann Whitney test). This could indicate that as a
result of the permanent seat, this region may feel a stronger ‘emotional interest’
in the overall distribution of payoffs, or simply has a better view on whom to
reward and whom to punish.
As rewards and punishments are costly (and in the case of punishments the
payoffs of both players even drop), both can be interpreted as a sign that strong
emotions occur. Since participants had to report their emotions before they
rewarded or punished (see section 2.1) we can check with this additional infor-
mation. Indeed, we do not find differences in the ‘level’ of emotions between
the treatments, but in the extent to which they generate punishments:30 The
results show that three negative emotions (anger, irritation and contempt) sig-
nificantly influence punishments,31 but the relationship between negative emo-
tions and punishments is (i) stronger in unequal rotation than in the other two
treatments, (ii) stronger for the large region with permanent voting rights than
for the rotating large region, and (iii) stronger for the larger regions than for
the smaller regions. Rewarding is less straightforward to interpret. Rewards
and emotions are not statistically correlated, and as Sefton et al. (2002) have
noticed, rewarding is generally less well-understood than sanctioning.
The data on emotions, rewards and punishment can also be interpreted
as measures of the attractiveness of the different decision-making procedures.
Taken together our results seem to indicate that participants view equal rotation
as the ‘fairest’ decision-making procedure, as all participants get to vote equally
often. Moreover, as punishments under equal rotation are relatively low, this
voting system seems to produce a minimum of frustration among the players.
4 Discussion
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
• First, committees that feature a rotation scheme decide faster. Without
rotation, committees tend to block decisions more frequently.
30As we measure emotions at intervals a (theoretical) possibility exists that experienced
emotions might differ over time between the treatments.
31The correlation between emotion and punishment is 0.25, 0.15 and 0.21 for anger, irritation
and contempt, respectively.
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• Second, rotation is likely to induce distributional effects. With rotation
voting committee members have additional scope to vote in their own
interests (as opposed to maximising the group payoff). Consequently,
their earnings increase, relative to non-voting committee members. Having
permanent voting rights increases the payoff even more.
• Third, all committee members could have increased their (average) earn-
ings by voting for the option with the highest total group payoff. By
maximising their own payoff, they get caught in a prisoners’ dilemma-like
situation. In addition, it seems that this effect is stronger without rotation
than with rotation.
• Fourth, there is a positive correlation between blocked decisions and frus-
trations of players. Players vetoing final proposals get punished, even
though this comes at a cost for the punisher and is only possible at the
very end of the experiment.
The design of the experiment captures various important aspects of real life
committee decision-making (albeit in a highly stylised manner), such as U.S.
monetary policymaking: The Federal Reserve System is composed of a central
‘hub’ – the Board in Washington – and twelve regional ‘spokes’ (the regional
Federal Reserve Banks, which are located throughout the country). The Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) – the body responsible for U.S. monetary
policy – comprises the seven Board members and the President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, plus four of the other eleven regional FED Pres-
idents. Among the latter the right to vote rotates following a pre-determined
sequence.32 The twelve FED districts are not equal in size (measured either in
terms of economic size and population).
In various aspects our design can be related to the FOMC: We have (i) re-
gions of different sizes, (ii) a region with a permanent seat and (iii) the trade-off
between common and individual interests. Regarding the latter, Meade and
Sheets (2005) suggest that at least some FOMC members face a similar trade-
off between regional and ‘common’ interests. Given these similarities, our re-
sults indicate that decisions taken by the FOMC need not always maximise U.S.
welfare. FOMC members might use their right to vote to address economic con-
ditions in their constituency, rather than the U.S. economy as a whole. Relative
to a situation where all FOMC members vote, U.S. monetary policy might thus
32The 1942 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act prescribes a rotation scheme of four seats
on the FOMC among eleven Federal Reserve districts. This annual rotation began on March
1, 1943; since 1990, the rotation has taken place each year on January 1. One voting seat is
rotated in a fixed fashion among members of each of the following FED districts: Cleveland
and Chicago; Atlanta, Dallas, and St. Louis; Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond; Kansas
City, Minneapolis, and San Francisco (see Meade and Sheets, 2005).
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be biased. In addition, decisions might also be systematically biased in favour
of the New York FED, as it has a permanent seat. That said, regional represen-
tation has a number of advantages, e.g. ensuring broad regional representation,
gathering and sharing of regional information by regional FED Presidents etc.,
which were not captured in our experimental design. These are clearly issues
for future research.
Appendix: Theoretical predictions
Overview
In determining how participants behave we can distinguish two alternative ap-
proaches: first, own interests dominate group interests. This can come in the
form of ‘naive’ or ‘strategic’ voting: naive voting implies that participants simply
vote for their first-best option, without considering possible strategic interac-
tions. ‘Strategic’ voting is possible within each round, as every participant has
perfect information about all committee members’ preferences’. Hence, each
player can use backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Alternatively, it could be the case that group interests are more important
than individual interests. In that case individuals could strive to maximise the
total payoff for the group as a whole (i.e. the sum of individual and common
payoffs), or simply aim at the highest common payoff. Table 5 and 6 contain
theoretical predictions for the following behavioural modes:
• Naive voting: Players make sincere proposals and veto (absence of any
strategic behaviour);
• Strategic voting: Players behaving strategically both in proposing options
and vetoing them;
• Median voter decisive: The preferred option of the median voter is chosen;
• Highest common payoff: Maximisation of the common payoff;
• Highest total payoff: Maximisation of the total group payoff.
Strategic voting
To solve for strategic voting we exploit the fact that all rounds are independent.
Let the set of options be I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let C denote the set of countries
with the right to vote,33 i.e. C = {c | c in the committee}. Without any loss
33Note that this set differs across rounds for equal and unequal rotation treatments.
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aNaive voting
bStrategic voting
cMedian voter decisive
dHighest common payoff: the option to maximise the common payoff
eHighest total payoff: the option to maximise the total group payoff
Table 5: Theoretical predictions (rounds 1-25)
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aNaive voting
bStrategic voting
cMedian voter decisive
dHighest common payoff: the option to maximise the common payoff
eHighest total payoff: the option to maximise the total group payoff
Table 6: Theoretical predictions (rounds 25-50)
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Figure 7: Game tree
of generality let country 1, 2 and 3 be respectively the first, the second and the
third country to propose an option. We derive subgame perfect equilibria using
backward induction.
Figure 7 shows the game tree (at some given round). Suppose that at node
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} country i makes a proposal pi ∈ I\{pj , j = 1..i − 1}, that is
country i makes a proposal from the set of feasible proposals (the set I without
the proposals that have been vetoed when the game reaches node i). Next move
will be at node i.o: voting country c, which is not the country that made a
proposal at node i and which is in the committee, i.e. c ∈ C/{i}, makes a
decision on accepting or not proposal pi. If proposal pi at node i.o is accepted
by all voting countries, then the game ends. Proposal pi is implemented, each
country (in or out of the committee) receives his payoff determined by the state
of nature at pi. Let u(pi) = (uj(pi))j=1..5 denote the vector of utilities34 that
each country gets when option pi is implemented. If proposal pi at node i.o is
rejected by at least one country c, c ∈ C/{i} the game continues to the next
node. At node 4, the game rule ‘an option can be proposed only once’ implies
that there is only one option which is not yet proposed. That option becomes
the proposal at that node, and all countries in the committee have the right
to vote. If the left option receives at least one veto then the state d of ‘no
agreement’ is reached. This is a state in which all countries receive the same
money payoff, i.e. πj(d) = D for all j = 1..5.
To solve using backward induction suppose that the game is at some node
4.35 Let the left option be p4, l ∈ I\{pi : i = 1, 2, 3}, where pi is the option
34For example, country j utility may equal his monetary payoff, i.e. uc(pi) = πc(pi).
35Note that there are 24 possible nodes 4. These nodes differ from each other by the path
of proposals made and rejected up to node 4. Remember, however, that we have 6 nodes of
type 4 with the same proposal i left on the floor since the size of the options set is 4. Hence,
there is more than one path ending up at winning option i. We will be looking for the shortest
paths assuming all players prefer to agree on an option sooner rather than later.
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proposed by country i. At node 4.o, the veto strategy of country c ∈ C is: accept
option p4 iff utility at p4 is not smaller than at d. Formally, this is written as
∀p4 ∈ I\{pi},∀c ∈ C
v4c (p4) = accept, if uc(p4) ≥ uc(d), (1)
= veto, otherwise
where d is the state where no agreement is reached.36 This implies that the
outcome at node 4, the game outcome f4(pi|i = 1, 2, 3) is
f4(pi) = p4, if ∀c ∈ C, uc(p4) > uc(d),
= d, if ∃c ∈ C, uc(p4) < uc(d).
Denote f∗4 = f4(pi|i = 1, 2, 3). Now consider node 3. Proposals that are feasible
at this node belong to I\{p1, p2}. Suppose that country 3 at that node 3 pro-
poses option p3. At node 3.o, country c ∈ C\{3} veto strategy is: accept option
p3 iff utility at f∗4 , (which is the final outcome if the game reaches node 4) is
not larger than at p3. Formally,
∀p3 ∈ I\{p1, p2},∀c ∈ C\{3}
v3c (p3) = accept, if uc(p3) ≥ uc(f∗4 ) (2)
= veto, otherwise
Hence, the outcome at node 3.o, f3(p3 | p1, p2) is given by
f3(p3 | p1, p2) = p3, if ∀c ∈ C\{3}, uc(p3) > uc(f∗4 )
= f∗4 , if ∃c ∈ C\{3}, uc(p3) < uc(f∗4 )
The common knowledge information setting of the game and rationality imply
that at node 3 country 3 proposes an option p3(p1, p2) that maximizes his own
utility. Formally,
p∗3 ≡ p3(p1, p2) = arg max{u3(f3(p3 | p1, p2)) : p3 ∈ I\{p1, p2}} (3)
Let f∗3 ≡ f3(p∗3 | p1, p2) denote the outcome of the reduced game at node 3 (see
figure 2). Given that, the veto strategy at node 2.o is as follows:
36Including the equality in the first row assumes that all countries prefer to reach an agree-
ment earlier than later. Thus, countries do not like to veto an option in case of indifference
which seems plausible.
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∀p2 ∈ I\{p1},∀c ∈ C\{2}
v2c (p2) = accept, if uc(p2) ≥ uc(f∗3 ) (4)
= veto, otherwise
Hence, the outcome at node 2.o, f2(p2|p1) is
f2(p2|p1) = p2, if ∀c ∈ C\{2}, uc(p2) > uc(f∗3 )
= f∗3 , if ∃c ∈ C\{2}, uc(p2) < uc(f∗3 )
Similarly as for country 3, we have that country 2 at node 2 proposes
p∗2 ≡ p2(p1) = arg max{u2(f2(p2|p1))) : p2 ∈ I\{p1}} (5)
Let f∗2 ≡ f2(p∗2|p1) denote the outcome of the reduced game at node 2. Writing
the same derivations for node 1.o and node 1 one has:
• the veto strategy at node 1.o is given by ∀p1 ∈ I,∀c ∈ C\{1}
v1c (p1) = accept, if uc(p1) ≥ uc(f∗2 ), (6)
= veto, otherwise;
• the outcome at node 1.o, f1(p1) is
f1(p1) = p1, if ∀c ∈ C\{1}, uc(p1) > uc(f∗2 ),
= f∗2 , if ∃c ∈ C\{1}, uc(p1) < uc(f∗2 );
• the proposal of country 1 at node 1 is determined by
p∗1 ≡ arg max{u1(f1(p1) : p1 ∈ I} (7)
Summarising, in a subgame perfect equilibrium:
1. The winning proposal is f1(p∗1);
2. Country 1 proposes option p∗1; if rejected then country 2 proposes p
∗
2 =
p2(p∗1); if rejected then country 3 proposes p
∗
3 = p3(p
∗
1, p
∗
2);
3. Country i’s proposal strategy at each node i is given by (3), (5) and (7);
4. Country c’s veto strategy at each node i.o is given by (1), (2), (4) and (6).
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Example
As an example consider round 6 in the experiment. The matrix of total indi-
vidual payoffs at this round is
Option 1 2 3 4
Country 1
Country 2
Country 3
Country 4
Country 5

201.25 407.5 580 432.5
126.25 307.5 430 582.5
201.25 407.5 580 432.5
126.25 307.5 430 582.5
301.25 557.5 430 332.5

and the payoff vector in case of ‘no agreement reached’ is [10, 10, 10, 10, 10]. In
that round, country 4 was the first to make a proposal, country 1 was the second
one and country 5 was the third proposer.
Assume that country’s preferences over options are represented by the fol-
lowing utility function:
uj(i) = πc(i),∀c ∈ C,∀i ∈ I
where πc(i) is the individual monetary payoff that country j receives if option i
is implemented. Applying backward induction and shortest path criteria gives:
Rotation ‘Country 4 proposes option 3, which is accepted by both countries
1 and 5.’
Option 3 is the first best option for country 1. For country 5 the first best
option is option 2, whereas option 3 is the second best. But country 5 can
do no better than option 3 since if he vetos option 3 then for both other
two countries, 4 and 1, option 4 becomes the most attractive one. Those
two countries will ally and at the next turn (node 2) country 1 proposes
option 2 and country 4 rejects it. After that, the best left option for all
three countries is option 4. But country 5 preferres option 3 to option
4 and therefore he will not veto that option at node 2.o. Similarly, one
can verify that country 4 can not do any better than option 3, given the
preferences of two other countries, and assuming that he likes the option
to be chosen sooner than later he proposes that option at his turn.
No rotation ‘Country 4 proposes option 3, which is rejected by country 2;
country 1 proposes option 2 which is rejected by for e.g., country 4; country
5 proposes option 4 which is accepted by all countries.’
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